

Message Text

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ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

66011
DRAFTED BY AF:BSALTER:OMS
APPROVED BY AF:AMB. HARROP

S/S-O:JGUNDERSEN
-----125051 310823Z /23
R 310037Z AUG 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 207971

EXDIS

FOL REPEAT PRETORIA 4458 ACTION SECSTATE INFO BONN DAR ES
SALAAM GABORONE LAGOS LONDON LUSAKA MAPUTO OTTAWA PARIS
DTD AUG 29.

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L PRETORIA 4458

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PDEV RH UK US SF
SUBJ: RHODESIA: OWEN-YOUNG TALKS WITH SAG

REF: PRETORIA 4454

1. OWEN AND YOUNG, ACCOMPANIED BY THEIR RESPECTIVE
TEAMS, MET THIS MORNING (AUG 29) WITH PRIME MINISTER
VORSTER, FONMIN BOTHA, SECRETARY OF DFA BRAND FOURIE,
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SOUTH AFRICAN AMBASSADOR TO RHODESIA OLIVIER, DFA
COUNSELOR NEAL VAN HEERDEN, AND HEAD OF DFA PRESS DEPART-
MENT NEVILE KRIGE. THE MEETING LASTED FROM 9:00 A.M.
UNTIL 12:30 P.M., WHEN IT WAS ADJOURNED UNTIL 5:30.
SUMMARY OF THIS SESSION WAS CONTAINED IN REFTEL.

2. BOTHA BEGAN THE SESSION BY SUMMARIZING HIS UNDER-
STANDING OF THE SALIENT FEATURES OF THE PROPOSALS
WHICH WERE PUT TO HIM IN LONDON, AND WHICH HE SAID HE
HAD EXPLAINED TO IAN SMITH. RESPONDING, OWEN CLARIFIED

SEVERAL POINTS, INCLUDING THE FACT THAT THE SOUTH AFRICANS' UNDERSTANDING THAT BILL OF RIGHTS AND OTHER ENTRENCHED CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION COULD NOT BE AMENDED FOR A MINIMUM OF EIGHT YEARS WAS INCORRECT; THE AMENDING PROCEDURE PROVIDES THAT CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION COULD NOT BE AMENDED FOR WHAT WOULD AMOUNT TO ABOUT FIVE YEARS. AND RHODESIAN ARMY WOULD NOT, AS BOTHA HAD SAID, BE KEPT INTACT. WE HAD AGREED IN LONDON THAT CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF THE ARMY WOULD HAVE TO GO.

3. AS HE HAD DONE WITH THE FRONTLINE AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, OWEN FOCUSED ON THE LAW AND ORDER SITUATION AS THE BASIC PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED. HE STRESSED THAT RHODESIANS HAD TWO OPTIONS--AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION OR AN INTERNAL SOLUTION. IF THE LATTER WERE CHOSEN, THE WAR WOULD CONTINUE, PRESSURE WOULD BE PLACED ON OUR THREE GOVERNMENTS, AND SOUTHERN AFRICA WOULD BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED. AN AGREEMENT ON THE TRANSITION PERIOD WAS THE KEY TO AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. THE RHODESIAN ARMY COULD NOT BE DISMANTLED, BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, A NEW ZIMBABWE ARMY HAD TO BE BASED ON THE LIBERATION FORCES. THE FRONT-
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LIN PRESIDENTS HAD AGREED TO THE RETENTION OF SOME ELEMENTS OF THE RHODESIAN FORCES. IT WAS ABSOLUTELY IMPERATIVE IN THEIR EYES THAT THE ENTIRE STRUCTURE OF PRESENT ARMY NOT BE KEPT INTACT AND THAT THE NEW ARMY BE BASED ON THE LIBERATION FORCES. OTHERWISE, THERE COULD BE NO SETTLEMENT. OWEN WENT ON AT SOME LENGTH (FOR OVER AN HOUR) TO EXPLAIN HOW THE FOUR PARTIES WOULD NEGOTIATE THE DETAILS OF THE STATUS OF MILITARY FORCES DURING THE TRANSITION, THE ROLE OF THE UN, AND THE REACTION OF THE FRONTLINE AND THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO THESE CRUCIAL ASPECTS OF A SETTLEMENT.

4. VORSTER THEN ASKED A SERIES OF QUESTIONS TO WHICH OWEN AND YOUNG RESPONDED. FIRST, HE WANTED TO KNOW THAT IF EITHER MUZOREWA OR SITHOLE WON THE ELECTION, WHAT GUARANTEE DID WE HAVE THAT NKOMO AND MUGABE WOULD ABIDE BY THE RESULTS. OWEN SAID THERE WAS NO ABSOLUTE GUARANTEE, BUT THAT A COMBINATION OF AN AGREED SETTLEMENT, UN INVOLVEMENT AND FRONTLINE BACKING--AND THE LATTER'S STRONG DESIRE FOR PEACE IN THE AREA--WOULD PLACE STRONG PRESSURE ON ALL TO ACCEPT THE ELECTION RESULTS. AMB YOUNG UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION BY POINTING OUT THAT THE CONTINUANCE OF CHAOS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF TURMOIL SPREADING FROM THE HORN OF AFRICA WERE ESSENTIAL TO THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY OF THE COUNTRIES IN BETWEEN.

THUS AT THIS MOMENT, ALTHOUGH THERE CONTINUES TO BE DIS-
AGREEMENT REGARDING A SOLUTION, THERE ARE MORE GROUNDS
FOR AGREEMENT THAN EVER BEFORE.

5. VORSTER STATED THAT WHAT OWEN AND YOUNG HAD SAID
WAS ONLY AN ASSUMPTION. DID WE HAVE ASSURANCES FROM
MUGABE AND NKOMO THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT THE ELECTION
RESULTS? OWEN RESPONDED THAT WE DID, AND YOUNG REPEATED
THAT THE FRONTLINE HAD STATED THEIR FIRM BACKING FOR
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FREE ELECTIONS. VORSTER WAS STILL NOT SATISFIED ON
THIS POINT AND ASKED WHETHER A NEW GOVT FORMED BY
MAZOREWA OR SITHOLE WOULD BE UPHELD BY UK AND US. HE
WENT ON TO SAY THAT, IF THE RHODESIAN GOVT WENT
INTO ELECTIONS, IT WOULD ACCEPT THE RESULTS, AND SOUTH
AFRICA WOULD SEE THAT "THEY WOULD CARRY OUT THEIR COMMIT-
MENT". HOWEVER, "THIS AGREEMENT IS LACKING ON
THE OTHER SIDE". YOUNG AND OWEN MADE THE POINT THAT,
ALTHOUGH NO GUARANTEE COULD BE GIVEN, WE COULD MAKE
IT CLEAR TO THE NATIONALISTS THAT IF THEY RENEGED ON
A DEMOCRATIC PROCESS, BENEFITS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
EVEN BEYOND THOSE OF THE ZIMBABWE DEVELOPMENT FUND,
WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE TO THEM FROM THE WEST. NO
BRITISH OR AMERICAN TROOPS WOULD BE PUT INTO THE AREA
BUT, WITH AN INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION, WE
WOULD BE MORALLY OBLIGATED TO DO ALL WE COULD TO SEE
THAT IT WORKED.

6. VORSTER THEN ASKED WHETHER SANCTIONS WOULD BE LIFTED
WITH THE INSTALLATION OF A RESIDENT COMMISSIONER, AND
WHETHER THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE BY A UN SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION. MCHENRY INFORMED HIM THAT SANCTIONS
WOULD BE LIFTED, BUT THAT A SC RESOLUTION WOULD NOT
BE NECESSARY. WITH ENOUGH CONSENSUS IN THE SECURITY
COUNCIL, THERE WOULD BE ACCEPTANCE OF A STATEMENT BY
THE UK THAT THE REBELLION WAS ENDED AND THE NEED FOR
SANCTIONS NO LONGER EXISTED.

7. VORSTER AND BOTHA EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT "DIS-
MANTLING OF THE RHODESIAN FORCES". WHAT DID WE MEAN
WHEN WE SAID "ELEMENTS" OF THE RHODESIAN ARMY WOULD
HAVE TO GO?" WHAT GUARANTEES COULD WE GIVE THAT THE
ENTIRE ARMY "WON'T BE DISMISSED TOMORROW IN THE TRANSI-
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TION PERIOD?" OWEN SAID THE BEST GUARANTEE WE COULD
GIVE WAS THAT NEITHER HE NOR THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER
DESIGNATE WOULD ACCEPT A SITUATION WHICH THEY COULD NOT
LIVE WITH. DETAILS OF WHAT ELEMENTS OF THE RHODESIAN

ARMY WOULD BE RETAINED WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THE TRANSITION PERIOD. BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE TO BELIEVE THERE WAS A BASIS FOR A CEASEFIRE AND, AGAIN, AGREEMENT BY BOTH SIDES HINGED ON RETENTION OF THE CORE OF THE RHODESIAN ARMY AND ACCEPTANCE THAT THE NEW ZIMBABWE NATIONAL ARMY WOULD BE BASED ON LIBERATION FORCES.

8. VORSTER WANTED TO KNOW THAT THE ROLE OF THE UN FORCES WOULD BE. OWEN AND YOUNG SPELLED THIS OUT IN SOME DETAIL. FOLLOWING THIS, VORSTER POSED A SERIES OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING HOW WHITES' FEARS COULD BE RELIEVED REGARDING LAW AND ORDER DURING AND AFTER THE TRANSITION. HE EMPHASIZED THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE SATISFIED ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE RHODESIAN ARMY. OWEN REPLIED THAT HE HAD TO SATISFY NOT ONLY THE WHITE RHODESIANS BUT ALSO THE NATIONALISTS AND FRONTLINE. WE COULD NOT FULLY SATISFY THE WHITES ON THE LAW AND ORDER ISSUE BUT, AS HE HAD NOTED BEFORE, THE BRITISH GOVT WOULD NOT INSTALL A RESIDENT COMMISSIONER UNLESS THE LAW AND ORDER QUESTION WAS SATISFACTORILY ANSWERED BEFORE THE TRANSITION. AS FOR THE RHODESIAN ARMY, IF TH UK AND US STATED PUBLICLY THAT WE WOULD NOT DISMANTLE THE RHODESIAN FORCE, THERE WOULD BE NO CHANCE OF AFRICAN ACCEPTANCE OF A SETTLEMENT. EQUALLY, A SETTLEMENT WOULD BE UNOBTAINABLE IF WE SAID WE WOULD DISMANTLE THE RHODESIAN FORCES. HE REMINDED VORSTER THAT THE AFRICANS HAD ACCEPTED THE PRESENCE OF ELEMENTS THE SMITH ARMY DURING THE TRANSITION--THAT THIS WOULD BE PART OF THE BASIS FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, THE MORE WE DISCUSSED THIS IN PUBLIC, THE MORE DIFFICULT IT WOULD BE TO GET AGREEMENT.

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9. VORSTER ASKED ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE TRANSITION PERIOD, INCLUDING WHETHER MUZOREWA OR SITHOLE WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE NEOGTIATIONS AMONG THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER, UN REP AND MILITARY COMMANDERS. THE RESPONSE WAS THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE, FOR THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY FORMED FORCES AT THEIR DISPOSAL. HOWEVER, THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER WOULD BE REPRESENTING THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE.

10. BOTHA EXPRESSED PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT THE FEASIBILITY OF TRAINING THE ZIMBABWE ARMY DURING THE TRANSITION. HE SAID HE WOULD NOT SEE HOW THIS COULD BE DONE DURING AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN, FOR THE VARIOUS CANDIDATES WOULD BE TRYING TO GAIN THE LOYALTY OF THE MILITARY. OWEN ADMITTED THAT THIS WOULD BE A PROBLEM, BUT NOTED THAT THE FORCES WOULD BE UNDER UN SUPERVISION AND THAT LAW AND ORDER WOULD BE MAINTAINED BY THE POLICE. MOREOVER, THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER WOULD USE HIS FULL

AUTHORITY TO ENSURE THAT THERE WAS NO INTIMIDATION DURING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. FURTHER, THE MODALITIES OF THE TRAINING WOULD BE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATIONS BY THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER AND THE OTHERS.

11. VORSTER VOICED ADDITIONAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE STATUS OF BOTH THE RHODESIAN MILITARY ELEMENTS AND THE LIBERATION FORCES DURING THE TRANSITION. HE SAID IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN THIS TO SMITH, ESPECIALLY SINCE WE HAD ADDED A NEW PARAGRAPH (11E) THE THE PROPOSAL. OWEN MAINTAINED THAT IF AN AGREEMENT CENTERS ON WHETHER OR NOT THE RHODESIAN ARMED FORCES WILL BE DISMANTLED, WE WOULD GET NOWHERE. HE SAID HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO THE FRONTLINE AND PATRIOTIC FRONT THAT THE RHODESIAN CONFIDENTIAL

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FORCES WOULD NOT BE DISMANTLED. YOUNG POINTED OUT THAT THE PARTIES WE HAVE SEEN HAVE TALKED REASONABLY IN PRIVATE, OIT EACH HAS ITS PARTICULAR CONSITUENCY AND MUST SPEAK IN PUBLIC ACCORDINGLY. IT WAS FOR THAT REASON THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, NYERERE HAD MADE HIS STATEMENT THAT THE SMITH ARMY WOULD BE DISMANTLED. OWEN EMPHASIZED ONCE AGAIN THAT IF WE WERE TOO SPECIFIC PUBLICLY ON THIS ISSUE, THERE WOULD BE NO AGREEMENT.

12. NEAR THE CONCLUSION OF THE SESSION, YOUNG STATED THAT WE HAVE THE ELEMENTS OF A SETTLEMENT THAT COULD BRING PEACE TO A ZIMBABWE THAT WOULD RELATE TO THE WEST AND ALSO TO SOUTH AFRICA. THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY IF WE WORKED TOGETHER. IF WE CULD NOT, THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE GRIM. NO ONE HAD BEEN ASKED TO MAKE A MAJOR COMMITMENT. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAD BEEN ASKED ONLY TO DISCUSS TRANSITION ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS. WE HAD ASKED THE FRONTLINE FOR THEIR GENERAL SUPPORT AND FOR THEIR BACKING IN THE UN. AS WE NEEDED THEIR SUPPORT REGARDING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT, WE NEEDED SUPPORT FROM SOUTH AFRICA REGARDING THE RHODESIANS.

13. VORSTER RESPONDED THAT SOUTH AFRICA HAD ALWAYS STATED IT PREFERRED A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. HOWEVER, IT WAS THE JOB OF THE UK AND THE US TO SELL A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE RHODESIANS. WE WOULD HAVE TO CONVINCE THE RHODESIANS THAT THE ARMY WOULD NOT GIVE WAY TO A "TERRORIST FORCE". HE WAS UNSURE WHETHER WE COULD DISPELL THEIR DISTRUST OF OUR MOTIVES, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE ADDITION TO THE SECTION IN THE DOCUMENT DEALING WITH THE TRANSITION. AT THIS POINT, VORSTER ADJOURNED THE MEETING UNTIL 5:30 P.M.
BOWDLER

UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 22-Sep-1999 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 31-Aug-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE207971
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: AF:BSALTER:OMS
Enclosure: DC ADJUSTED PER PRETORIA 4795
Executive Order: 11652 XGDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D770314-0899
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197708117/baaaetqv.tel
Line Count: 277
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: a7ea5751-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: PRETORIA 4454
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 10-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1446527
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: RHODESIA: OWEN-YOUNG TALKS WITH SAG
TAGS: PDEV, RH, UK, US, SF, (YOUNG, ANDREW), (OWEN, DAVID)
To: USUN N Y
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/a7ea5751-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009